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Introduction 
A Simple Theory of 
Constituency Influence 
When combined, the set of ideas advanced in Chapter 2 constitute a highly 
simplified model of a representative's world as he ponders whether to cast a yea 
or nay. In this chapter we will ascertain how model representatives would behave 
in several of the contingencies which 1night arise in this model world. Three 
constituency configurations are examined. First, we will analyze the voting 
decision given a consensual or homogeneous district; i.e., a situation in 
which the groups who possibly care about the issue would agree on what 
the representative should do. Such homoegeneity seldom will hold across all 
issues in a real world district, but on particular issues it is probably often 
the case that only one group cares. Additionally, the fairly cornn1on "God, 
Motherhood, and Apple Pie" votes no doubt find all significant constituency 
groups in accord. 
Our other two configurations involve the voting decision given a conflictual 
or heterogeneous district; i.e., a situation in which two significant constit­
uency groups are in opposition. First, we will exarnine the voting decision 
when the issue is highly salient .. -sure to becon1e a campaign issue. Then we 
turn to the nlore general case in which potential conflict exists, but the 
can1paign i1npact is less certain. 
To give the reader a better idea of where we are going, we sugge:o.t here 
that the analysis in this chapter provides a plausible model of the voting 
behavior of representatives from safe and marginal districts. That is, in the real 
world, districts which vote overwhelmingly for a representative are those 
which tend to be homogeneous in their structure of group interests. Con­
versely, districts which give representatives narrow margins are those which 
contain conflicting group interests. That electoral safety goes with district 
honrogeneity and electoral marginality with district heterogeneity is by no 
means a new argument. In Chapter 5 we note the works of numerous 
political scientists who have made such an observation. Additionally, we 
present son1e data bearing on the correspondence. Interestingly, though, the 
analysis in this chapter helps to explain just why safety should accompany 
district homogeneity and marginality heterogeneity. We shall elaborate as the 
analysis proceeds. 
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Roll-Call Voting Decisions with a 
Consensual Constituency 
·--···- ----· 
Consider the decision 111atrix given in Table 2-2 of the previous chapter: C· > 0 
fur only one group in the constituency, or the entire constlluency constitJtes a 
single group for which tj > 0. A representative never faces a less an1biguous 
situation. llow dues he behave? 
For a n1axin1izcr, the answer is trivial. Voting with one's constituents is a 
do1ninant strategy: no 1natter what the state of nature, voting with one's 
constituents is at least as good and son1etin1es better than voting against then1. 
This conclusion holds no rnatter what the strength of the group nor what the 
probability that they care. Thus, given a consensual district a maximizer is 
coinpletely a slave to constituents' preferences. En1pirically, then, if safe districts 
;ne those which tend to be hon1ogeneous, ;ind new representatives tend to be 
1naxi1ni1.ers, one would expect that newly elected representatives from safe 
districts arc rnaxi1nally responsive to constituency wishes. 
Now consider a maintaining representative. Recall that a maintainer regards 
an <Jcceptable voting strategy as a discrete probability distribution over the 
strntegy set such that the expected value of his vote, E ( !J.p ), exceeds or equals 
zero. Having attained his personal p*, the 1naintainer is content to do no worse 
than break even on each vote. The exact 1naintaining strategy is easily 
calculated: 
I! ( 6p) () Qcx+Q(l - c )O+( l --Q)c(-z)+(l ··Q)(l -·c)O 
Qcx - xz + Qcz 
cz = Qc(x+z) 
z 
- =Q (3.1) 
x+z 
Equation (3.1) indicates the maintaining strategy for the homogeneous case. 
For exarnple, jf z = .03, x = .02 , then Q = .6. Thus, a maintainer can vote with 
his constituents with any probability between .6 <ind 1.0 and still expect to 
satisfy the condition p >:p*. If his party leader is pushing him to vote against 
constituents, he can vote so as to 1naintain p exactly unchanged and still support 
the party leader with probability .4. Notice that .5 � Q � I because z �x, and x 
+ z > o.a A nwintainer will end up voting with his constituents at least half the 
tin1e on the average. 
Several other features of Equation (3.J) deserve notice. First, Q increases or 
ren1ains const<lnt al its n1axi1num as z increases: the greater the threat to a 
aRecall th<it the repre�cntative includes in his decision problem only those G; who ( 1) have 
nonzero l'j, and (2) are significant: ( x; + z;) =: S; > 0.  
I 
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representative's reelection that a constituency group can pose, the higher the 
probability that the representative must accede to their wishes. The proposition 
see1ns en1inent!y plausible. Second, Q decreases as x increases: the greater the 
help to a representative's reelection that a constituency group can offer, the 
lower the probability that the representative must vote in accord with their 
wishes. This second proposition reflects the maintainer's intention only to 
niaintain his probability of reelection. Wilhin the frmnework of the theory, then, 
one finds a difference between the effects of gains and losses. So far as 
influencing a n1aintainer goes, potential losses ;ire more important than potential 
gains. Constituents should threaten the stick, not promise the carrot. Notice 
finally that if x == 0, Q = l regardless of the value of z. In this case the 
niaintaining strategy coincides with the niaxilnizing strategy. 
The x == 0 case has two seemingly plausible en1pirical interpretations. First, in 
son1e districts there exist "gut" issues for which constituents consider a vote 
witll the1n as the very sine qua non of representation. A right vote rnerils no 
reward·- any dutiful representative could only think of voting one way. Con­
versely, a wrong vote on such issues a1nounts to an abject betrayal of the 
represent;itive's trust. These are the crucial issues on which constituency 
overrides all other considerations. As one exan1ple, we suggest Civil Rights votes 
in rnany Southern districts during the l950s. b Abortion votes in sorne heavily
Catholic districts provide another exan1p!e.c On votes like these, ho1nogeneous 
constituencies produce only rnaximizers. 
A second interpretation involves not intense, "gut" issues, but rather "God, 
Motherhood, ;ind Apple Pie" issues. Although opinion is homogeneous in such 
cases, il ·is likely that x == 0, since a representative hardly can expect to be 
rewarded for casting a vote in favor of Motherhood. Of course, a vote against 
Motherhood is ;inother nlatter, so that z > 0. 
bin their representation study Miller and Stokes relate the story of the defeat of Brooks 
Hays by Dale Alford in the Arkansas 5th Distric t .  Hays was perceived as <1 " moderate" on 
Civil Rights owing to his refusal t o  sign the Southern Manifesto, and t o  his service as an 
inter mediary between Washington and Little Rock during the school crisis. More extreme 
than Hays ,  Alford won on a write-in vote! Moreover , every constituent interviewed ha d read 
or heard s omething about both candidates . The comparable n<itional figure was 24 percent. 
See Miller and Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," p p .  50-51. 
cconsider the following case: In 1970 the "liberal" abortion bill passed by the New York 
Sena te lay dead in the House apparently, 74 · 74 (a majority of the full membership of the 
House-76-is required t o  pass legislation) . B ut befor e the Chair could announce the def e;it 
of the bill, Representative George Michaels, a Democrat from a heavily Catholic district 
stepped t o  the microphone and changed his vote fr om "nay" t o  "aye." Speaker Perry 
Dur yea then cast the ?6th and winning vote. Michaels , previously best known for his bill 
n;iming the bluebird the s tate bird of New York, expressed the opinion that his vot e switch 
w;is political suicide. Happily for believers in constituency influence, he w;is correct. 
Michaels was denied the nomination of the local party, defeated in the primary, and 
tr ounced in a three"way election. For those wh o might be inter ested, Michaels , a J ew, 
reported acting as he did from family pressures (one son called hi m <l "p olitical wh ore"). See 
the New York Times, Apr . 10, 1 970, I :8, 42: I, Apr . 20, 1970, 63:4; Ap,·. 23, 1 970, 36:2; 
Jun e 5 ,  1970, 40:4;N ov.4,  1970,  19:l;Nov. 5 ,  1970,43:3 . 
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Another li1niting case of en1pirical interest occurs in the event that a single 
group (or a ununitnous district) has "n1ake or break'' power over a maintainer. 
That is, the group's support coutd render him certain of reelection, while their 
opposition could render hi1n certain of defeat. In this case, the theoretical 
v<1ri"Jbles take on their 1naxinn11n values. These are 
z = p 
x = z - € if p ,:;; .5
x = l . . .  p if p > .5
€ � 0 
lfp <;; .5, Q = __ I'__ = __ P_ and lim Qp -- e + p 2p - € e--+O 2 
lfp > .5, Q 
p 
= p .
-- p + p 
Tilus, Q tends to 1h or to p whichever is larger in the case where a totally
<lo1ninant constituency group exists. Interestingly, where one constituency 
group overshadows all others, the higher a maintainer's probability of reelection, 
the 1nore bound to that group he becomes. A possible exa1nple of this 
pheno1nenon is the Southern Democratic Congressmen during much of the 
J 950s an<l 1 960s. Because of constituency-legislative party conflict one might 
expect n1ost of the Southern De1nocrats to be maintainers. On Civil Rights 
legislation their relevant constituency groups were blacks and whites, but owing 
to the disenfranchise1nent of the former, the effect ive constituency was 
hoinogeneous. Given that whites were a powerful enough group to make or 
break the Representative, one would expect that these Representatives showed a 
fealty to constituents which directly tnirrored their own probability of reelec­
tion. The more confident they wefe, the more adamantly oppose d to Civil 
Rights legislation they would have been. Although variation among the Southern 
De1nocrats on Civil Rights votes was slight, this hypothesis may be testable. 
Leaving the question of payoffs aside for a moment, we call attention to a 
very interesting feature of Equat ion (3.1). In making his voting decision one 
1night expect the representative to take into account the payoffs associated with 
each alternative and the probabilities of the states of nature. In our notation, Q 
= f ( c,x,z ) . But notice that one can write Equation {3. l) as Q = /( x,z ). That is, 
in the one group case the nrnintainer's choice of voting strategy does not depend 
on his estin1ate of the probability that the group cares. Whether c = .01 or .99 
makes no difference. And, as previously mentioned, this conclusion applies as 
we ll to a maxin1izer's voting. Obviously, voting with the constituency group 
re1nains a dominant strategy no n1atter where in the internal (0, 1 .0) c falls. 
------��____..=:===�����-----
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Thus, where an issue is of potential concern to only one group in a district, the 
actual probability they will respond to it is irrelevant to the repre5entative's 
voting decision. 
Recall now the major reason for despairing of the existence of constituency 
influence: mass ignorance and apathy about legislative issues and records. But we 
have just found one theoretical situation in which mass unawareness of the 
representative's actions does not matter, so long as someone may be watching 
somewhere ( c > 0). Th us, while the extent of voter awareness and information 
may be an interesting empirical question, a highly informed, issue-conscious 
constituency is not a necessary condition that must be met i n  order to link the 
representative's voting to  his constituents' preferences. 
Now let us turn to a slightly more complicated type of constituency 
homogeneity: two or 1nore significant groups might be expected to care about 
the issue, but they would agree upon how the representative should vote.ct Table 
3-1 illustrates the voting decision problem for two significant groups. 
Evidently, m ost of our previous conclusions do not change. For a maximizer, 
voting with the constituency groups is the dominant strategy, irrespective of the 
precise values of x, z ,  and c. For a maintainer, the maintaining strategy is given 
by Equation (3.2): 
Q = C 1Z 1 + C2Z2 
C1X1 + C2X2 + C 1Z1 + C2Z2 (3 .2) 
Again, Q �  .5  because zi � xi. And Q increases or does not change as either zi 
increases, while Q decreases as e ither xi increases. If x 1 = x2 = 0, the maintaining
strategy coincides with the maximizing strategy; i.e., Q = I .  These facts are 
exactly a nalogous to the one-group case and extend to any number of groups in 
the homogeneous case. 
The one conclusion which changes concerns the relevance of the ci for
Table 3-1 
Voting Decision Given a Two-Group Consensual Constituency 
h s, r�Ob � . �(,,_ G1 G2 G1 "' G2 "' G, G2 ...., G, ...., G2 
StrategyZ_ c, c2 c , ( l - c2 )  O - c, )c2 (1 - c, ) (l - c2 )
with 
against 
X1 + X2 
-Z1  - Z2 
x. 
-z, 
x, 
-z, 
0 
0 
dPerhaps real world representatives tend to combine all groups into two: pro and anti. If 
such were the case, the two-group consensual constituency would reduce to the one-group 
case just analyzed. Still, in the presence of significantly different cj, keeping the multigroup 
structure of the problem intact seems advisable. 
'""' ""'��;:.;:= ' �i;;:.:;.":;"-"··-·-� ..... . 
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111:.iint<iiner voting. Although the c; :.igain are irrelev:.int for maximizer voting, 
they are irrelevant for n1aint<1iner voting only in two speci<il cases. First, if all the 
xi equal zero, Q = I :.ind does not vary <JS any of the ci change. Second, if the ci 
:.ire equal, they are irrelevant to the n1aintainer's choice of strategy. Equality 
could <1rise either because of issue salience ( ci = I, 'r;/ i ), or because extreme 
uncertainty leads the representative to <Jdopt a version of Laplace's Principle.C 
So1newhat disappointingly, when the c1 are relev<1nt to the voting decision, 
one cannot say exactly how they are relevant without additional conditions 
being imposed on Lhe payoffs. One n1ight sup�ose that as either ci increases the 
probability a 1naintainer has to vote with his constituents similarly increases. 
Such is not the case. Q 1nay increase, decrease or remain constant as the ci vary. 
As constituted, the rnaintainer nlodel yields no unique prediction about the 
relationship between Q and the c1. 
This co111pletes our analysis of the consensual constituency. To recapitulate, 
the following set of conclusions follows fro1n the analysis: 
I. Maxilnizcrs always vote with constituents; nrnintainers do so at least half the 
tiine on the average. 
2. In the one-group case, no representative votes any differently when his 
estinrnte that constituents care is high fro1n when it is low. 
3. In the rnultigroup case, maxilnizers still are not influenced by the probabil­
ities that constituents care; n1aintainers are not influenced only if xi = 0, 'r:li, 
or ifc . = c· \;/ . .  
4. The �utiif� tl��ibility of maintainers increases as the perceived positive 
sanctions of consliluents increase, while flexibility decreases as perceived 
negative sanctions increase (unless xi = 0, Vi, in which case maintaining 
requires maximizing which involves no flexibility). 
Consider briefly now the iinplications of these conclusions for the voting 
behavior of representatives fro1n safe districts. If safe districts tend to be 
hornogeneous districts, one should not expect to find safe representatives free to 
ignore their constituents as son1e have suggested. Rather, these representatives 
will vote with constituents at least half the tin1e on average. Indeed, the analysis 
suggests the major reason consensual districts tend to be safe districts . In such 
districts there exists a maxilnizing strategy which leads at lvorst to no loss in 
subjective probability of reelection and usually a gain. Similarly, maintaining 
strategies always exist even though they 111ay coincide with maximizing strategies 
at tin1es. By the intelligent exercise of maximizing and maintaining strategies, a 
representative can render his seat safe and maintain it in that condition. As we 
CThc Laplace Principle of Insufficient Reaso n is a c lassical procedure for decision making 
under uncer tainty. According to this principle, if one is  totally u ncer tain abou t the 
probabilities o f  fu ture states of th e wor ld, one sho uld assu me they are equiprobable. In the 
case of independent cj !he Lapface Principle is equivalent to assuming cj = ck = .5, 'rJ j,k· 
·-- -· �··--· 
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shall see, such a happy situation does not always exist in contlictu<1l constit· 
uencies. For this reason such districts tend to be competitive. 
Roll-Call Voting Decisions with a 
Conflictual Constituency and Highly 
Salient Issues 
Frorn a situation of blissful constituency harmony, we now move to one of deep 
constituency division. Two significant groups hold opposing preferences on a 
highly salient issue. Wh<Jt kind of voting should one anticipate from a representa­
tive of this heterogeneous constituency? His voting decision problem appears in 
Table 3-2_ 
Let us assume the representative is certain that the groups care; i.e., c 1 = c2 = c = I .  Moreover, let us begin by assuming the groups are evenly matched ; i.e., S 1 
= S2 . This special case poses a quandary for the representative. If faced with 
many decisions like this, he cannot long survive in the electoral area. 
Consider first the maximizer. His expected return from a1 is c ( x 1 - - z2 ), and 
from a2 , c ( -- Zi + x.2). From the identity, Sj = ( xj + z .  ), one sees that c ( x 1  z2)  = c ( - z1 + x2). Thus, E ( a 1 ) = E ( a2). Both ftrategies yield the sa111e 
payoff. Furtherrnore, that payoff is nonpositive. 
Proof 
Assume the contrary: E ( a1 ) = E(a2 ) > 0.
Then CX1 > CZ2 (a) 
and CX2 > CZ 1 (b) 
Applying the assumption that zj � xj t o  (a) and (b), 
Table 3-2 
Voting Decision Given a Two.Croup Conflictual Constituency 
� P.r06 <Jte �i.fr.. G1 G2 G, '"' G2 '"' G1 G2 ,..., G1 ,..., G2 
Strategy� C1C2 c1 0 ·- c2) (1 c,) c2 O - c1 ) {1 - c2 )
with G1 
agains t G1 
X, - Z2 
-Z1 + X2 
x, 
_,, 
_,, 
x, 
0 
0 
""' 
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CZ1 � CX1 > CZ2 ( c) 
CZ2 ;;,, CX1 > CZ J ( <l) 
(c) and (d) <1rc contradictory, thereby falsifying the hypothesis that t,' ( a 1 )  and 
1'.' ( a 2 )  arc both equal and positive. One sees then that the maxi1nizer finds 
hin1self in a situation in which rnaxi1nizing has a trivial n1eaning. His strategies 
;ire equivalent in yielding the saine non positive expected value. Only if z 1 = x 1  = 
z2 = x2 will the 1naxi1nizer's probability of reelection not fall ( l'.' ( a 1 )  = H ( a2 )  
= 0). J n  all other cases the expeeted v<1lues of his strategies are negative. 
Siini!arly, the fact that t: ( a1 )  = H ( a2 )  �O implies that a maintaining 
strategy exists in only one special case, nan1ely, if z 1  = x 1 = z2 = x2 which 
iinplies that no tn<itter what the 1naintainer does, he just exactly breaks even; 
every slralcgy is a 1naintaining strategy. In all other cases no rnaintaining strategy 
exisls; i.e., !he n1aintainer cannot nwint<1in. He loses. 
So, one sees th<1t in an evenly divided, pol<1rized constituency, neither 
1naxi1nizer nor n1aintainer usually can expect anything but a decline in his 
subjective probability of reelection. In this special case all voting strategies yield 
identical, generally unsatisfactory payoffs. A representative who faced such 
decisions continually inevitably would be defeated. 
But, Jet us proceed to the 1nore general case of S 1 * S2 . As specified in 
Chapter 2, assutnc tha! the groups are ordered fro1n stronger to weaker; i.e., ( z 1  
+ X 1 )  > ( z2 + x 2  ) .  The a1nbiguity o f  the equal strength case now disappears, 
particularly for the 1naxit11izer. One can show easily that E ( a 1 )  > E ( a 2 )
thereby i1nplying that a 111axi1nizer always should vote with the stronger group. 
Proof 
E ( a 1  ) "- 1',� ( a2 ) = cx1 - cz2 - cx2 + cz 1  
c (S1  � S2 )  
which of course is positive if S 1 > S2 . 
Note that the maxin1izing strategy is not necessarily a profitable one. That is, 
although E ( a 1 ) > E  ( a2 ) ,  E (  a 1 )  nrny be negative. In such a case the maximiz­
ing strategy is simply a loss-mini111ization strategy--the lesser of two evils. Thus, 
given high-issue salience, even unequal group strength is not sufficient to get the 
1naxi1nizer out of the woods. By now, some implications for the voting behavior 
of n1arginal representatives are ernerging, but we will delay a discussion until 
analyzing the behavior of the maintainer. 
Given that c1 = c2 = I, and S 1 > S2 , Equation (3.3) is the maintaining 
strategy 
5 1  
Q 
Z t  - X2 
z 1 - x2 + x , -- z2 
(3.3) 
Existence is the first question of interest, In order for a maintaining strategy to 
exist, one must have 
o ,,-;; 
Z 1 - X2 
Z t  --X2 + X i  -- Z2 
<;; I 
Given the assurnption that zj � xj, the preceding condition holds if and only if 
condition (3.4) holds 
X 1  � Z2 (3 .4) 
From condition (3.4) one sees that even though the groups are not precisely 
equal in strength, if x1 < z 2 ,  the niaintainer has no maintaining strategy. In fact, 
under certain conditions no maintaining strategies may exist even if the groups 
are not nearly comparable in strength. For exa1nple, if a strong group practices 
retribution ( z1 large) but not reward ( x1 s111all), condition (3.4) 1nay not be 
1net, even though the opposing group is rather weak. But despite a nu1nber of 
possible e1npirical interpretations the relation x1 < z2 provides a general 
indicator of the constituency conditions which niake life difficult for n1ain­
tainers. Note that if x 1 = z2 , Q = l ;  i.e., n1aintaining and 1naximizing coincide. 
Given that a n1aintaining strategy does exist in the S1 >S2 case, what can 
one say about it? first, Q is greater than one-half. 
Proof 
By Assumption, 
(a) Zt � X1 
(b) Z2 � X2 . 
Given that condition (3.4) holds, (a) and (b) imply (c): 
therefore 
(c) z, � x ,  � z 2  � x2 , (where at least one inequality is 
strict because S 1 > S2 ) 
(d) ( z 1  - x2 ) > (x 1  - z, ). 
52 
Adding ( z 1  - x2 ) to both sides of(d),  
(e) 2( z 1 - X2 ) > ( x i - Z2 ) +  ( Z 1  X2 ) . 
Cleurly, any positive fraction with the right-hand member of (e) as the 
deno111inator will be greater than a fraction having the same nu1nerator but the 
left-hand rne1nber of (e) in the denon1inator. In particular,
Q = 
( x ,  
z ,  x, 
> 
Z2 ) + ( z 1 - X2 )
Z 1  X2 
2(z1 - x2 )
Q.E.D. 
2 
So, if a 1naintaining strategy exists in the conflictual, high-salience case, that 
strategy establishes a lower bound on the representative's voting such that he 
always votes for the stronger group with probability greater than one-half. 
Depending upon the payoff values, be 111ay have 111uch voting freedom, or he 
nrny have little. Unfortunately, though, one can draw no firm conclusion about 
this n1aller, for Q does not vary uniforn1!y with variations in group strength. 
Consider the following cxan1ples: 
I .  z i :::: . 1 5  Z 2  :::: . J 5 
X i "" . 1 5  x2 = . 1 4  
S i = .30 ,)'2 :::: .29 
:. S i  -- 5'2 = .01 
. 1 5  - . 1 4  Q = - - --·- -· = 1 .0 
. 1 5  . 1 5 + . 1 5 - . 1 4  
2.  
Z i = .40 Zi :::: . 1 5  
X 1 =. .35 Xi = . J 5 
Si = .75 s, = .30 
:. S i  s, = .40
.40 - . 1 5  
Q - = .56 . 35 -- . 1 5  + .40 -- . 1 5
Under case I above the groups are as closely 1natched as is possible (to two
decinial places), given zj � xj and condition {3.4). In this situation a maintainer
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must vote exclusively with the slightly stronger group. Under case 2 above one 
group is two and one-half times stronger than the other. Yet in this case a 
maintainer must vote with the stronger group only with some probability � .56. 
According to some traditional argun1ents, representatives from closely divided 
districts take moderate, middle-of-the-road positions.f We have seen already that
if c 1  = Ci = I, maxin1izers vote exclusively with the stronger group, in apparent 
conflict with a spirit of moderation. The preceding examples show that 
maintainers too, n1ay violate the traditional argun1ents. In case l , nlaintaining 
requires a representative to adopt a maximizing strategy-a certain vote with the 
stronger group- even though the weaker group has 97 percent as n1uch strength 
as the stronger one. In case 2 ,  on the other hand, the weaker group has only 40 
percent as 1nuch strength as the stronger one, yet the representative can afford 
to adopt what might be viewed as a moderate voting strategy: voting with the 
stronger group with probability .56 and with the weaker group with probability 
.44. 
As mentioned, however, Q does not vary uniformly with the difference in 
strength of the two groups_g Rather, Q varies oppositely with the co1nponent xi, 
z · of each Sj" Thus, which components of group strength give rise to the disparity in group strength n1ake a great deal of difference. Generally, Q 
decreases as x 1 increases and decreases or ren1ains constant asx2 increases. As z 1  
increases, Q increases or remains constant, while as z 2  increases, Q increases . 
Thus, to predict variations in Q fro1n variations in group strength alone is 
impossible. One needs to know, in addition, the relative influence of positive and 
negative aspects of group strength. But one 1night bear in mind the exa1nple 
which shows that maintainers from conflictual districts may be more closely 
bound to the stronger group if it is barely stronger than its oppo�ition than if it 
is overwhelmingly stronger. 
At this point let us summarize our conclusions about representatives' voling 
behavior given highly salient issues and conflictual districts. 
I .  If contending groups are equally matched, maximizers can only 1ninilnize 
their losses, and maintainers generally cannot nlaintain. 
2. If contending groups are not equally matched, maximizers vote always with
the stronger group, although a positive payoff is not guaranteed. Maintaining 
strategies still may not exist, but if they do, the maintainer will vote with the 
stronger group with probability greater than one-half. 
3. Given x1 > z2 ; as the threat potential ( z1 ) of either group increases, the 
probability a maintainer must vote with the stronger group increases. But that 
fSee Chapter l . 
ITT'hi s fact establishes a difference between the maintaining model and Huntington 's theory 
discussed in Chapter 1 .  Huntington seems to asser t that th ere is an i nverse monotonic 
relationship between the constituency par ties' strength differential and their policy 
di fferential. We find no uniform relationship in the maintainer model. 
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prohabllity declines as the reward potential ( xi )  of either group increases. If
x 1  "' Z2 ,  {l equuls onc. 
4. Maintainer voting does not vary n1onutunically with the disparity in strength
of tile contending groups. Maxirnizer voling does not vary at all with the 
strength disparity. 
Finally, we nwkc !he obvious poiut that the preceding conclusions apply 
anyti1ne c 1 = <·2 regardless of whether they equal one. That is, equality of the ci 
insures their irrelevance for voting behavior in the model. If  a new issue arises for 
which a representative is completely uncertain about the likely constituency 
in1pact, he n1ight presun1c that groups are just as likely to care as not to care (a 
version of Laplace's Principle). This presun1ption on his part would lead him to 
vote exaclly the sanie way as he would were he certain that constituency groups 
cared ( C · = I ,  V .  ). Thus, within the present 1nodel, we continue to find special
· / I · I / d . . 1 · . cases m w 11c l a concerne , 1ssue-consc1ous cons Jtuency 1s not a necessary 
condition for constituency inf1uence. 
In considering the implications of the analysis for the voting behavior of 
representatives fron1 niarginal districts, we e1nphasize two points. First, because 
of the heterogeneous character of their districts, marginal representatives may 
llnc.l the1nsclves in "can't win" situations. No matter how careful they try to be 
in voting, they so1netin1es will be unable to prevent their probability of 
reelection fro1n declining. Thus, the 111odel provides a sin1ple and plausible 
explanation for the e1npirical correspondence between district marginality and 
district heterogeneity. The heterogeneous structure of the district renders it 
n1uch niore difficult for a representative to use his vote profitably than if the 
district usually has a consensual configuration. Marginality does not produce a 
relatively high vote of electoral Jefeat. Rather, heterogeneity produces both 
1narginalily and turnover in office. 
Second, we find no general tendency for representatives from closely divided 
districts to adopt 1noderate, co1npro1nise positions. In fact, if the district group 
structure stays basically the san1e from issue to issue, maximizers would show 
anything but con1pron1ise positions. Instead they would be voting exclusively 
with the stronger group. On the other hand, with a highly fluid group structure, 
one could itnagine situations in which voting with the stronger group on each 
issue could result in an overall record which appeared n1oderate. For maintainers 
the situation is even less detenninate. In order to predict, one needs to know the 
values of x 1 ,  z 1 ,  x2, z2 . 
Throughout this section we have assumed that c1 = c2 • Either the representa­
tive was certain significant groups cared about the issue, or he was so uncertain 
of their concern that he presu1ned they were just as likely to care as not to care. 
Much of en1pirical reality no doubt lies between these two poles. So, we now 
turn to voting decisions given a conf1ictual constituency when the ci are not 
equal. 
Roll-Call Voting Decisions with a 
Conflictual Constituency 
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If two significant conflicting groups have unequal probabilities of caring, the 
voting strategies representatives 1nust adopt are dependent on the magnitudes of 
those probabilities. Naturally, two cases arise. In the first, the stronger group has 
a higher probability of caring. The second case is ren1iniscent of a classic subject 
in democratic theory : the intensity problen1. 1 The group that can do less to the 
representative's probability of reelection than its opposition has a greater 
likelihood of doing so.h We will take both cases in turn for maximizers and then 
for 1naintainers. 
Because H ( a 1 )  = ( c 1 x 1 - c2z2), and H ( a2 ) = ( - c1 z 1  + c2x2), one sees 
that H ( a 1 )  -· E ( a2) = ( c 1 S 1  -- c2S2). By the ordering of groups from stronger 
to weaker, S 1  ;;;-. s2 • Thus, H ( a 1 ) > E ( a2)  if c 1  > c2 •  The latter would be a 
sufficient condition for the niaxin1izer's choice of a 1 •  But even if c1 � c2 , 
E ( a 1 )  1nay be greater than E ( a2 )  if Si exceeds S2 sufficiently that 
c 1 S 1  > c2S2 . Thus our condition should be 1nore precise. A necessary and 
sufficient condition for H ( a 1 )  > H ( a2) is siinply
C1/C2 > S2/S1 (3.5) 
Thai is, even if c1 < c2 , the 1naxi1nizer still chooses to vote with the stronger
group if Ci is closer in magnitude to c2 than the strength of the weaker group is 
to the strength of the stronger group. 
In exactly parallel fashion the 1naximizer votes with the weaker group if 
c 1 /c2 < S2/S1 (J.6) 
Naturally, if c1 /c2 = S2/S 1 , E ( a 1 )  = E ( a2) and the nlaximizer is indifferent 
between his two strategies. Note that if c 1  = c2,  (3.5) sun1marizes our 
conclusions about n1aximizer voting in the previous section. 
Thus, where the ci are not equal, they are relevant for voting behavior. In 
particular, a group may use its  high potential to make a campaign issue out of a 
vote to offset its strength disadvantage on the vote. I f  a representative estimates 
that ci = 1 .0 for a local sportsmen's club on a gun-control vote and n1iniscule for 
hOne s hould be aware that there are difference$ between the concepts utilized in our 
analysis and those used in the debate about the intensity problem. For example, we sp eak of 
strong and weak groups but do not necessarily eq uate these with the majorities and 
minorities of democratic theory. M oney can affect p as well as numbers . Additionally, the 
probability es timate that a group cares seems more a measure of s alience than one of 
intensity, though the two concep ts clearly are related. Actually, " intensity" is one of lhe 
most difficult of all social science concep ts to get a grip on. For discussions, see Alvin 
Rabushka and Kenneth Shepsle, A Theory of Democratic Instability (Columbus: Merrill, 
1972), Chap ter 2; D ouglas Rae and M ichael Taylor, The Analysis of Political Cleavages (New 
Haven: Yale, 1970) ,  Chapter 3.  
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everyone else, rnaximLdng 1nay dictate voting with the hunters despite their 
sntall nutnhers. Of course, we ohserve such behavior regularly in real world 
legislatures. 
Maximizer voting varies with changes in the ci exactly as one would expect.
Recall again th<.1t H( a 1 )  = ( c 1x 1 - c2z2 ), while !:' ( a2 ) = ( · - c 1 z 1  + c2x2 ). As
c1 increases, H ( a 1 )  increases or re1nains constant while E ( a2 }  falls. This 
i1nplies th<.1t as G 1 increases the likelihood that H ( a 1 ) > H ( a2 )  increases.i The 
higher the prohability that the stronger group cares, the greater the likelihood 
the m<.1ximizer finds voting with thetn to be his optinrnl s1rategy. Conversely, as 
c2 increases, H ( a  1 )  decreases while E ( a2)  increases or remains constanl. This
i1nplies th<.11 as c2 increases the likelihood that H ( a  1 )  < H ( a2) increases. The 
higher lhe probability that the weaker group cares the more likely is the 
maxi1nizer to find voting with them his optimal strategy. Whatever one's 
position on the justice of the 1natter, 1naxin1izers in the model "weigh votes as 
wet! as count them." 
For rnaintainers, (3.7) is the 1naintaining strategy in the unequal Ct case. Of 
course, if c1 = c2 (3.7)
Q 
c 1 z 1 - c2x2 
(3.7) 
C 1 Z 1  - C2X2 + c 1X1  C2Z2 
reduces to (3.3). Again, we rnust ascertain the conditions under which 
0 " Q  � 1 .0.  Unlike the earlier case of condition (3.4), the unequal ct case gives 
rise to two conditions. A first sufficient condition for the existence of a 
1naintaining strategy is 
C 1 X 1  � C2Z2 .or C 1 /C2 � Z2/X1 (3.8) 
This condition insures that the nun1erator of (3.7) is nonnegative (because 
z .  � xj, \J j ) and less than or equal to the deno1ninator. Therefore, 0 " Q  � I .rl'ut there also exists another sufficient condition for the existence of a 
1naintaining strategy: 
C 1 Z 1  � C2X2 or c1/c2 � x2/z 1 , (3.9) 
Condition (3 .9) insures that the numerator of (3.7) is nonpositive and greater 
than or equal to the denon1inator (also nonpositive). But then the absolute value 
of the nu1nerator is less than or equal to the absolute value of the denominator 
and cancellation of the minus signs yields 0 "  Q "  l .  
iStrictly speukmg, 01 course, !!.: ( a , )  either will or will not be gr eater than E ( a1 ). Thus, we 
use the ter m "likelihood" in the sense in which it is used in statistics. From an a pr iori 
standpoint,  high l' 1  and low c, make it more likely that E ( a , )  > E ( a2 ). Low c1 and high 
c, make it m ore likely that I.!: ( a2) > t.'(ai ). 
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The two sufficient conditions, (3.8) and (3.9), establish bounds on the ratio 
c1/c2 • Specifically, they show that no nlaintaining strategy exists if 
X2/Z1 < C1/C2 < Z2/X1 (3. 1 0) 
Thus we arrive at a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a 
maintaining strategy in somewhat roundabout fashion; c 1 /c1 must not fall inside 
the open interval given by (3. 1 0). 
One can 1nore readily exarnine the conditions for the existence of nrnintaining 
strategies if we divide these strategies into two classes. We say that a representa­
tive has a Type l maintaining strategy if the first sufficient condition (3.8) holds. 
Similarly, a representative has a Type II 1naintaining strategy if the second 
sufficient condition (3.9) holds. Then we can say that inequalities (3.8) and 
(3.9) are necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of Type I and 
Type II maintaining strategies, respectively. 
Since the preceding discussion may have seen1ed rather abstract, we present 
some fictional decision problems in Table 3-3. I n  the first case we illustrate a 
Type I n1aintaining strategy, c 1 /c2 = 6/3, which satisfies (3.8), or alternately,
exceeds the upper bound given in (3. 1 0). In case 2, c 1 /c2 = 1 /6 ,  which satisfies 
(3.9), or, alternatively, falls below the lower bound in (3.10). Thus we have a 
Type I I  maintaining strategy. In case 3, c 1 /c2 = 3/6, which lies within the crucial
interval (3. 1 0). In this situation no optiinal strategy exists. The attempted 
calculation leads to an absurdity: Q = -- 1 .0.  
Obviously, the appearance of the ci in the n1aintainer's decision rule yields
sorne results which differ from those of the earlier analysis. We have seen three 
such differences already. First, even if the groups are so closely matched that a 
maintaining strategy would not exist in the equal ci case, the maintainer has an
optimal strategy if his estimate of the probability the stronger group cares 
sufficiently exceeds his estilnate of the probability the weaker group cares to 
render c1x 1  � c2z2 .  
Second, we  have seen that even if  the above condition does not hold, the 
legislator's estimate of c1 may be sufficiently sn1all and/or the estinrnte of c2 
sufficiently large that both the numerator and denominator of Q are negative. 
Thu3 the 1naintainer has the possibility of satisfying his reelection goal by 
heeding the wishes of a concerned few, if they exist. 
Third, we have seen that in an example of the case just discussed, Q = . 1 1 .  
This indicates that our analysis in the preceding section does not extend to the 
general case. In fact, it is the case that if a maintaining strategy exists via 
satisfaction of the Type I I  sufficient condition, Q � .5. To see this, consider the 
following: 
From (3.9), if a Type I I  maintaining strategy exists 
C l  Z 1 - C2X2 = · - E where e � 0 
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Table 3-3 
Decision Proble1ns Ill ustrating the Conditions for the Existence of Maintaining 
Strategies 
Ca>c I .  Xi -= .2 
, , 4 
c, = .6 
c1 /c2 "' 6/3 > 3/2 = z2/x 1 .  :. A Type I Str�tegy Exists 
Q '-' .88 
Case 2. x, = .2 
z, = .4 
l'1 = . J  
c ,  /c2 = 1 /6  < 1/4 = x2/z, . :. A Type I I  Strategy Exists 
Q = . J J  
Case 3. x, = . 2  
z 1 = .4 
l'i .3 
X2 "' . I 
Z2 = .J 
l'2 = .3  
X2 "' .1  
Z2 = .3 
C2 = .6 
X2 = . I 
Z2 = .J 
C2 = .6 
X2/Z1 = 1/4 < 3/6 = c 1 /c2 < 3/2 = z2/x, . Therefore, no nrnint:iiningstralegy exists 
for this decision. 
Q = 1 .0 which t.:ontradicts the definition of Q as a prob:ibility, 
0 ,;; Q ,;:;  I 
By assuniption zj � xi''t;ft Therefore,
( C1X 1  -· C2Z2 ) ..:;;;: (c ,z 1  - C2X2 ) -- € 
Jel ( C 1 X 1  · l'1Z2 ) .:;;; -- ( E + .6 )  where .6 > 0 
Then 
Q 
-- € 
( c + ll )  € 
€ -- c I 
(2c + LI )  
� I 2 Q.E.D. 
Thus, where a Type II nrnintaining strategy exists, it will specify that the 
representative vote with the weaker group with prob·Jbi!ity at least .5 .  
A s  one 1night expect, Type I 1naintaining strategies specify that a repre-
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sentative vote with the stronger group with probability at least .5) The proof
parallels the above. 
Thus, the behavior of inaintainers, too, may reflect a weighing of preferences 
as well as counting of them. But before theoretical confirmation of our con1mon 
sense notions n1akes us too sanguine, Jet us exan1ine the maintaining strategies 
n1ore fully. Specifically, how does Q vary as c 1  and c1 vary? Because Q is 
meaningful only within a cer!ain range and contains several discontinuities and 
"steps," one n1ust exercise care in differentiating !his function. But differentiat­
ing within "s1nooth" and substantively 111eaningful ranges, we have the following 
facts: 
OQ _ jc,(x1 + 2 1 ) -- c2(22 + x2 ) J 2 1  - (c 12 1  - c2x2)(z1 + x 1 )  
ac1 - jc 1 (X 1  + 2 1 )  C2 (X2 + Z2)] 2
l' 1X 12 1  +c 1zi  - l'222Z1 C2X221 - C1 zi +C1X2Z1 C 1 Z 1 X 1  + c2X2X1 
fc 1 (X 1  + z 1 ) - c2 (x2 + 22 ) ]
2 
C1X2X1 -- l'2Z2Z1
fc i (x1 + z 1 ) -- ci (xi + z2 )J
2 � 0 because zj ;;,. xj' 'r;ft 
aQ [c, (x, + z , ) - - c,(x, + z,) ] ( -x, ) - ( c , z , - c,x, ) [ - (z, + x,,
) ]  
ac2 lc 1 (X 1  + z 1 ) -- C2(X2 + z2 )J 2 
-C1X1X2 - C 1 Z 1 X2 + c2X� + c2X1Z1 + c 1 Z 1 Z2 - C2X2Z2 +c, z 1 X2 - C2X� 
[c1 (X1 + z , ) - c2 (x2 + z2 )] 2
l' 1 Z 1 Z2 -- l' 1X 1X2 
fc 1 (x 1  + z , ) - ci (x1 + zi )]
1 ;;,. 0 because zj ;;,. xi
, Vt
So, as c1 increases, Q decreases or remains constant, while as c2 increases, Q 
increases or remains constant. Amazingly, in the maintainer model with a 
two-group, heterogeneous constituency, as the probability that the stronger 
group cares increases, the minimum probability, Q, that the representative 1nust 
vote with the1n decreases or stays constant. Conversely, as the probability that 
the weaker group cares increases, the maximum probability (I - Q )  that the
representative can vote with them decreases or stays constant. Thus, lhe lj affect 
iNotc that in the equal ci case only Type I maintaining strategies exist (except in the special 
case of x, = z1 = z2 = x2 which makes all strategies maintaining strategics and the 
denominator of (3.7) zero). 
a nwintainer's voting in the n1odel predsely opposite to the 1nanner in which 
they :.ifl'ect a rnaxin1izcr's voting. In the 1nodel, if one's representative is a 
1naintainer, to cause birn to raise his estirnate that you care may be to work 
against ynurself. Twu exan1ples will il lustrate !his phenornenon. 
F.xatnple I: 1:ype I 1'1aintaining Strategy 
let x , = . 1 5 X2 = .05 
Z i  = .:\0 Z2 = . ! 0  
Case A.) C i  = .4 . 1 2  . .  02 
('2 = .4 
Q = �;; = .83 
Case B.) <' 1 = 1 .0 .JO .02 
C2 = .4 
Q = .45D6 = .72
Case C.) c,  = .4 . 1 2  .03 
l'2 = .6 
Q 
. 1 8 .09 = l.O
Thus, as c 1 increases (.4 tn 1 .0), Q decreases (.83 to .72). Conversely, as c2 
increases (.4 to .6), Q increases (.83 to 1 .0). By effecting an increase in c 1  the 
stronger group only increases their representative's voting latitude. By e ffecting 
an increase in c2 the weaker group only drives the representative rnore closely 
into the arn1s of the opposition. 
h'xan1ple 2: Type II Maintaining Strategy. 
let X 1  = .24 
Z 1 = .30
Case A.) C J  = .3 
C2 = .6 
Case B.) c, = .4 
C2 ::: .6 
Case C.) l'1 ::: .3 
l'2 ::: 1 .0 
Q =  
Q =  
Q = 
X2 = .20 
Z2 = .25 
.09 - . 1 2  -.03 
= - = .29 
. 1 65 - .270 ·-. 1 05 
. 1 2  - . 1 2  
. 22 ... . 27 0 
.09 .. . 20 -.II
= --- = .39 
. 1 54 -- .45 -.285
Thus, as c1 increases (.3 to .4), Q decreases (.29 to 0), while as c2 increases 
(.6 to 1 .0), Q increases (.29 to .39). Again the raises in c,- lead to counterpro­
ductive results from the standpoint of constituents. If the maintainer 111ode! has 
any resen1blance to reality, findings attesting to voter ignorance niay not 
illustrate irrational or even nonrational behavior; quite the contrary. To 
con1municate with one's representative before a vote might backfire if he 
happens to be a 1naintainer. 
There is, however, one fairly important qualification to the preceding 
ren1arks. Sufficiently large increases in the ci may alter the strategic situation 
which exists; i.e., to one or no n1aintaining strategy, or from a Type l to a Type 
II strategy o r  vice versa. If a Type I strategy exists, the stronge r group should 
never make an effort to raise c1 , but the weaker group might try to raise t2 in an 
effort to change the strategic situation; i.e., from Type I to Type 1 1 .k Of course.
if the weaker group fails to raise c2 enough, they may end up in a position worse 
than the initial one. If a Type I I  strategy exists, the same conclusion holds with 
the roles of the groups reversed. 
Well, we have a logical fact that changes in the ci produce differenlial changes 
in  the nun1erator and denoininator of (3.7). Just how meaningful is that fact? 
Many will find the interpretation of the mathematics so counterintuitive that 
they will reject it substantively without further ado. What does such a reje ction 
imply? What assumptions are driving the maintainer model in the conflictual, 
unequal c1 case? 
Well, to begin with the arguments j ust presented are not terribly robust. For 
example, i f  we go from the two-group case to the n -group case with t wo or more 
contending groups on each side, Q may increase, decrease , or stay constant as 
any particular C ·  varies. Similarly, i f  we do not assume independent lj, the 
dependence of Q on the c. is indeterminate. Finally, if we allow the c- to be 
dependent on the X · and �i' we cannot rnake the ceteris paribus assubiption
necessary for partiaf diffe rentiation. Thus, one or more of the simplifying 
assumptions utilized i n  the analysis may be giving rise to the peculiar behavioral 
pattern found in the model world. As these assumptions are re laxed, unusual 
substantive conclusions may disappear. Still, the counterintuitive conclusions 
simply give way to indeterminate situations as we relax assumptions. Given 
kTo elaborate, if a Type I maintaining strategy exists (i.e., if C 1X 1 ;;.. c2z2), Q increase� 
toward 1 .0 as c2 increases. But if it is possible; i.e., if c, < I ,  for c2 to increase to the point 
that c, Xi < c2z2• Q becomes at first greater than I .  Since Q is a probability restricted to 
the interval [O, I J ,  we consider Q undefined at these values of c2 . Nevertheless, if c2 
continues to increase, at some value the negative term ( Ci X1 - c2 z2) may equal the positive 
term ( Ci z 1  - c2x2). At this value of C2 , the denominator of Q is zero-a mathematical 
discontinuity. Beyond this point Q is negative for a time-again a defined discontinuity . 
Finally, if it is possible for c2 to increase still more, we may reach the point where 
Ci z, < c,x2, the realm of the 'fype I I  maintaining strategy, whereupon Q leaps into the 
interval [O, .5 ] ,  and then increases to .5 if a further increase is possible; i.e., if c2 still is less 
than one. 
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particulur values of the theoretical variables the counterintuitive dependence of 
Q on the cj 1n<Jy still llold. Given other values, conunon sense conclusions may 
follow. 
Si1nplifying assu1nptions <iside, the nrnintaining notion itself probably bears 
1nuch of the responsibility for any surprising analytic implications. After all, 
even in the presence of s.i1nplifying as5un1ptions the n1axin1izing notion produced 
no jarring conclusions. To digress 1no1nentarily, we have investigated a variant of 
the n1aintainer n1odel in which p* re1nains forever constant rather than 
"tracking" p .  Thus, a representative typica!ly finds himself an amount, v, away 
fron1 p* and votes so as to retun1 to p* on each vote. In that variant if v is 
positive, a Q/a C i '  is strictly negative, while aQ/a C2 is indeterniinate. I f  v is 
negative, OQ/a C i  is indctcnninute while aQ/a C2 is strictly positive. Perhaps it is 
the case that satisficing models siinply will produce some strange consequences 
when applied to real situations even if few simplifying assun1ptions are present. 
Of course, there is one further possibility: na1nely, that the peculiar behavior 
observed in the n1odeJ actually occurs ernpirically. More than a few observers 
have noted that pressure can be counterproductive.2 Consider the familiar
"profiles in courage" on the part of our representatives. A highly controversial 
bill will come to the floor for a vote . Various interests carry out active lobbying, 
a few dire threats arc heard, and, no doubt, someone rises in debate to say that 
in all his·- years in , he has never seen such intense, unashamed 
pressure politics. But in the end, son1e representatives bravely stride forth 
apparenlly to vote their consciences and/or the public interest. Without 
downplaying entirely courage, integrity, and other admirable qualities, one 
might note that in the 1nodel world, such activities are far less dangerous and 
thus less courageous than they uppear. Take, for example, organized labor's 
intensive lobbying effort during passage of the Lundrum-Griffin Bill in 1959. 
Supposing that labor is the weaker group (vis-ii-vis management) in most 
Republican constituencies, by threatening Republican Congressmen, labor only 
was lessening the probability that Republicans could vote against the bill. And, 
in tuking an antilabor stand in the face of fierce pressure , Republican Congress­
nwn 's courageous behavior happened to coincide with allowable voting accord­
ing to our analysis:l In view of the not-infrequent occurrence of incidents like 
this, perhups the conclusions of the conflictual two-group maintainer model 
should not be dismissed so quickly. 
In any case, we do not regret the opposile conclusions the analysis implies 
about the effects of varying ci on maximizer and maintainer voting. At best, the
conclusions are e1npirically accurate, in which case we have learned an extremely 
interesling fact about legislative behavior. At worst, one set of conclusions (most 
likely ubout the nlaintainer) is empirically wrong, in which case we have some 
ideu of which theoretical ideus deserve no further attention. Either way, we have 
increased our knowledge. 
To summarize then, the analysis implies the following conclusions about 
voting behavior in the two-group conflictual case: 
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l .  When c1 � c2 maximizers vote exclusively with the stronger group: if c 1  < c2 
they may switch allegiance to the weaker group if (3.6) holds. In neither case 
will the vote necessarily result in a nonnegative change in probability of 
reelection. 
2. Maintaining strategies may not exist. If a Type I strategy exists, a n1aintainer
must vote with the stronger group with probability at least .5 . If a Type I I  
strategy exists, a 1naintainer 1nust vote with the weaker group with probabi!­
i ly at least .5 .  
3. As the probability that u group cares increases the likelihood that a 
maxirnizer votes with the1n also increases. But for n1aintainers the opposite is 
true. As the probability thut a group cares increases, the probubility that a 
n1aintainer must vote with them decreases or remains constant. 
4. f\.1aximizer voting varies with group strength only to the extent that (3.5) or 
(3.6) holds. Maintainer voting varies with group strength in no consistent 
pattern. 
Overall, we find that in the general case of the two-group conflictual 
constituency the previous implications for the voting behavior of marginal 
representatives are reinforced . Maximizing strategies may involve choosing the 
least damaging position. Maintaining strategies may not exist. Whether the ci are 
equal or unequal, high or low, representatives may not be able to use their votes 
to increase their probubilities of reelection. Thus, a representative whose district 
customarily displays heterogeneity of interests will face a more difficult task in 
casting his roll-call votes than a representutive whose district customarily 
displays hon1ogeneity of interests. Aguin, heterogeneity makes marginality more 
likely. 
Implications 
In this chapter we have examined u simple model of constituency influence on 
representative' roll-call voting. Our pri1nary effort has been to analyze and 
compare voting decisions given consensual or conflictual constituency configura­
tions. Jn this concluding section we wish to discuss some implications of the 
analysis for the study of constituency influence. 
We will only briefly mention a persistent theme of the chapter. Becuuse of 
the structure of the respective decision problems, representatives whose districts 
tend to be consensual on most votes can render and maintain their seats safe by 
voting intelligently. Conversely, representutives whose districts tend to be 
conflictual on most votes may have no way (within the model) to increase or 
1naintain their probabilities of reelection. They are between the proverbiul fire 
and frying pan. Thus, the nlodel provides a simple explunation for the oft-noted 
en1pirical correspondence between district homogeneity and electoral safety on 
the one hand, and district heterogeneity and electoral 1narginality on the other. 
Enough said, un ti! Chapter 5 .  
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One of the general i1nplh.:ations of the 1no<lcl is extremely signiflcant for the 
interpretations of existing e1npirical studies of constituency inlluence on roll-call 
voting. Recall th;ll roll-t:all voting behavior in the model does not vary in any 
nice linear fashion with group strength. Let us push this finding a bit. Consider a 
group of representatives who vote on a nu1nbcr of similar labor bills and esti1nate 
that c1, for labor equ:.ils c8 for business on each bill. Now, assun1e that son1e 
conslituency den1ographic characteristic (e.g., percent blue collar) correlates 
perfectly with group strength in the district. Thus, in districts which include 0 to 
x percent blue collar, labor is the weaker group, while in districts which include 
x to 1 00 percent blue collar, labor is the stronger group. How will our 
sample of rnodel rcpresenta!ives behave? For maxin1izcrs the theoretical pattern 
will appear as in Figure 3-J . For maintainers the pattern will appear as in Figure 
3-2. Now, if one were to regress labor support on percent blue collar, what 
would the statistics show? For rnaxin1izers, 1naintainers, or any mixture of the 
lwo, linear regression would estimate a positive relationship but a poor 
fit- exactly what nun1erous einpirical studies show. Furtherinore, if son1e 
dkhoton1ous vari:iblc (e.g., party?) were highly correlated with labor's posilion 
,as the stronger or we:ikcr constituency group, then controlling for that variable 
would result in no statistical relationship within subgroups for maximizers and 
only coincidental rclalionships for rnaintainers. Thus, in our 1nodel-a model in 
which constituen(V is the prin1ary inf7uence on legislative voting behavior--the 
application of co1nn1only used statislical techniques would lead to the erroneous 
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Figure 3-1 .  Predicted Proportion of Prolabor Votes by Maxilnizers. 
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Figure 3-2. Predicted Proportion of Prolabor Votes by Maintainers.*
*The exact locations of data points within the Northeast and South­
west quadrants depends on the particular values of the xi> zi. A priori 
there is no reason to expect any given patterning rather than another. 
conclusion that at best, constituency influence operates through the party 
medium, and at worst, that no constituency influence exists.I Too often 
researchers write as if the only alternative to a linear relationship were no 
relationship. But statistical models applied to data contain implicit behavioral 
models. If these implicit models are wrong, the substantive conclusions drawn 
are likely to be wrong also. 
On a more positive note, the model provides a number of testable proposi­
tions, although data difficulties cannot be minimized. Of course, our conclusions 
do not resemble the "simple" familiar empirical propositions. Nowhere do we 
hypothesize that "scores on scale x increase rnonotonicaily with percent urban 
lfor those not fa01iliar with the statistical analyses referred to, we present an example. 
Using simple linear regression, we have estimated the relationship between AFL·CIO COPE 
scores and percent blue collar in 323 non-Southern Congressional districts for the 88th 
Congress. According to traditiom1I hypotheses, support for organized labor will increase as 
the proportion of blue collar workers in a district increases. Such in fact is the case: Y = 
37.05 + I .42X, R2 = .09, a weak relationship to be sure, but not atypical of those political 
scientists ordinarily find. Yet when we split the data set by party, for Republicans ( n =
1 7 1 )  we get Y = 10.8 + .27X, R2 = .01,  while for Democrats ( n = 157) we get Y = 77.05 + 
.31X, R2 = .04, negligible relationships. Thus the typical conclusion: controlling for party 
eliminates the appearance of constituency influence. But we know that percent blue collar is 
related to electing Democrats rather than Republicans. Thus we have the situation discussed 
in the text above. If our theory were correct, constituency influence would be present but 
the method would not uncover it. 
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as defined by the Census Bureau." Instead we present the somewhat more 
co1nplex relationships implied by Equation (3.7) and the discrete rather than 
continuous relationships predicted for maxi1nizer voting. But any criticism on 
this score scen1s misplaced. Jn rationalizing why their correlational methods 
account for so little of the variance in roll-call voting, researchers frequently 
point to the "con1plexity" of the voting decisions-the "myriad forces which 
iinpinge upon the legislator." We too, are saying only that the relationship 
between conslituents' preJCrcnces and the voting decision is a bit more subtle 
than heretofore admitted. Hypothesizing that roll-call voting is linear with 
demographic ch<iracleristics of constituencies is just too simple. At least our 
analysis suggests that is so. 
Additionally, e1npirical researchers may be somewhat disappointed by the 
unfainiliar tern1s i11 which our conclusions are stated. We do not say that 
Southern Congressn1cn are most bound to their constituents on civil rights votes, 
or that niid-westcrn Republicans are most bound on farm price support votes.
Instead we speak of strong and weak groups, increasing and decreasing c/s, etc.
Searching for regularities on the level of specific groups and issues involves 
searching on the wrong level in our opinion. These particular groups and issues 
1nay Jetennine the values of the xi, zj, and ct But generalizing about the values 
of the decision coniponents, which may be quite variable and short-lived, see1ns 
far less profitable than generalizing about the way in which the components, 
whatever they are, affect the decision. If our theory is tested and not falsified, 
staternents about Southern Dcn1ocrats, 1nid-westcm Republicans, gun-control 
votes, foreign-aid votes, etc. 1nay be made on the basis of the test, but they hold 
011/y because at the tin1e of the test they affected the theoretical variables in a 
particular way. Ten years from now particular substantive statements might be 
reversed while the general propositions of the theory could be supported to the 
saine degree as before . 
We realize that some of the propositions advanced may strike the casual 
rea<ler as rather obvious hypotheses that common sense unaided by decision 
theory would lrnve suggested. Perfectly true. But a theory which implied 
exclusively nonobvious propositions would probably be wrong; i .e . ,  falsified. 
The fact that son1e of the theoretii.:aJ propositions appear perfectly acceptable 
and expected provides an indication that we are on the right track and 
encourages testing the less obvious implications. 
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